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Abstract 
Regarding traffic safety, railway crossings are crucial points in the rail and road network. In Hungary the safety ranking of railway 
crossings has been performed since 1993 and the results have been used for selecting unsafe locations and for prioritizing safety 
measures. Prioritization is based on a complex point system taking into account accident data, traffic volumes and various traffic 
engineering aspects. Weights of various indicators were based on engineering judgement. Although this method has been renewed 
a few times, there is a need to update this method involving more thorough statistical methods. The objective of this paper is to 
calibrate a new model and to compare it with previous models. 
A sample of about 1700 railway crossings satisfying a few requirements (railway with public service, traffic volume data available) 
was set up. The first part of the paper describes data collection. Five years (2010–2014) of accident data, AADT (Annual Average 
Daily Traffic) for rail and road, speed limits and further data (road pavement width, control devices, crossing angle, alignment, 
number of tracks, sight distances) were gathered. The modeling was conducted in two steps. First, each variable was entered into 
the model alone to see which ones significantly affect accident frequency. As a next step, two-variable models were built where 
expected injury accident frequency is predicted by annual daily road traffic and annual daily rail traffic. The sample was also split 
up into subgroups based on the type of control devices in order to analyze their effect on safety. Models are proposed using the 
Generalized Linear Modeling approach (GLM) assuming a negative binomial error structure. 
The results give estimation of the impacts of explanatory factors on the safety of railway crossings. Annual daily road traffic and 
annual daily train traffic are significant predictors. A number of predictors such as crossing angle, track alignment, number of 
tracks and sight distances turned out to be not significant. As far as the type of control devices are concerned, as expected 
coefficients are decreasing, hence safety is increasing in the following order: passive crossings, flashing lights, flashing lights + 
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half barriers. Based on the above results, the complex point system used by practitioners for safety ranking was simplified 
considerably leaving out variables which turned out to be not significant. 
© 2016The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Road and Bridge Research Institute (IBDiM). 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between crashes and road geometry has been thoroughly analyzed using safety performance 
functions describing how the safety performance of road facilities is related to various road characteristics. In the 
beginning of the 1980s a few researchers started to demonstrate problems associated with conventional regression 
techniques used for accident prediction (e.g. Hauer et al., 1988 and Miaou and Lum, 1993). Miaou and Lum (1993) 
for instance used four regression models and demonstrated that the conventional linear regression models are not 
appropriate to make probabilistic statements about vehicle accidents, and that if the vehicle accident data are found to 
be significantly overdispersed relative to its mean, then using the Poisson regression models may overstate or 
understate the likelihood of vehicle accidents on the road. To overcome these problems later on the negative binomial 
modeling method became a widely accepted modeling technique and was recommended by many researchers e.g. 
Abdel-Aty (2000) and was also used in other road categories such as urban arterials by Sawalha and Sayed (2001). 
Oh et al. (2006) gave an overview of the statistical models used to examine the relationship between railway 
crossing accidents and features of crossings, emphasizing that the already developed models lack descriptive 
capabilities due to their limited number of explanatory variables. Previously developed crash prediction models will 
be introduced briefly in the followings. 
The Ohio Method was developed in 1959, and takes into account a broad set of physical crossing characteristics. 
Among these characteristics are train speed, the grade of the roadway approach, the angle of the roadway relative to 
the tracks at the crossing, the number of tracks, and sight distance at the crossing (Saccomanno 2003). 
The City of Detroit Formula developed in 1971, uses a large number of physical crossing attributes as well as crash 
history data in determining a crossing’s hazard index. Some of the factors used are overall train volume, train volume 
by type of train (passenger, freight, switch), sight distance, number of tracks, the condition of the crossing, the type 
of warning device installed at the crossing, and the occurrence of collisions (Saccomanno, 2003). 
The New Hampshire Formula was developed in 1971, and utilizes three basic crossing characteristics to determine 
the hazard index: roadway vehicle traffic, train traffic, and the type of warning device installed at the crossing (Tustin 
1986). The New Hampshire formula is expressed as in Equation (1): 
ܪܫ ൌ ܸ ൈ ܶ ൈ ௙ܲ   (1) 
where: 
HI = Hazard index of crossing 
V = Average annual daily traffic 
T = Average annual daily train traffic 
Pf = Warning equipment protection factor (Automatic gate: 0.10 or 0.13; Flashing light: 0.20, 0.33, or 0; Signs only: 
1.00) 
The Peabody-Dimmick Formula, also referred to as the Bureau of Public Roads Formula, was developed in 1941. 
It uses daily roadway vehicle and train traffic and a protection coefficient to estimate the number of crashes that are 
expected over a five year period (Tustin 1986). The Peabody-Dimmick Formula is given in Equation (2): 
ܣହ ൌ ͳǡʹͺ ൫௏
బǡభళబ൯൫்బǡభఱభ൯
௣బǡభళభ ൅ ܭ   (2) 
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where: 
A5 = Expected number of crashes in 5 years 
V = Average annual daily traffic 
T = Average annual daily train traffic 
P = Protection coefficient 
K = Additional parameter 
 
The National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Report 50 provides a complex crash prediction 
model that can be simplified and used in conjunction with several tables and graphs. The main crossing characteristics 
utilized are train and roadway vehicle traffic and a constant based on the type of warning device. The simplified 
NCHRP Report 50 Formula is expressed as in Equation (3): 
EAF = (A)(B)(CTD)   (3) 
where: 
EAF = Expected crash frequency 
A = Average annual daily traffic 
B = Safety constant for warning device 
CTD = Average annual daily train traffic 
The Coleman-Stewart Model, developed in 1976, uses roadway vehicle traffic, train traffic, and four coefficients 
to determine the predicted number of collisions at a crossing. Each of the four coefficients has 12 possible values 
based on two subsets of crossing characteristics. The first crossing characteristic is the type of warning device used at 
the crossing – passive, flashing lights only, or flashing lights and automatic gates. The second subset of crossing 
characteristics is whether the crossing is single-track in an urban setting, single-track rural, multi-track urban, and 
multi-track rural (Coleman 1976). 
The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Model, which was refined and revised throughout the 1970s and 
early 1980s before being finalized in 1986 (Hellman 2007), uses two equations in determining the number of predicted 
crashes at a crossing. The first equation is based on a crossing’s characteristics, including highway and train traffic, 
the number of tracks, the number of trains during daylight, whether or not the highway is paved, maximum train speed, 
the type of highway, and the number of highway lanes (Tustin 1986). The first portion of the U.S. DOT Model is 
expressed as in Equation (4): 
a = K × EI ×MT × DT × HP ×MS × HT × HL  (4) 
where: 
a = Initial crash prediction (crashes per year) 
K = Formula constant 
EI = Exposure index factor 
MT = Main tracks factor 
DT = Day train traffic factor 
HP = Paved highway factor 
MS = Maximum train speed factor 
HT = Highway type factor 
HL = Highway lanes factor 
Each of these factors must be determined from a given table, and each can range in value depending on the type of 
warning device used at the crossing – passive, flashing lights only, or flashing lights with automatic gates. The second 
formula in the U.S. DOT Model combines the basic first formula with crash history data to determine the final 
predicted number of crashes (Tustin 1986).  
Oh et al. (2006) gave a comparison of the above detailed models, emphasizing that the differences between the 
models might be the result of many underlying factors affecting safety and also the random fluctuation in crashes in 
combination with relatively low crash counts posing significant modeling challenges. 
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Within the framework of the 6th EU R+D program, the SELCAT project (RSSB, 2008) gave a general overview 
on level crossing risk evaluation methodologies. In addition, SELCAT produced a detailed own model, recommended 
for use after adaptation for country specific data.  
The Australian Level Crossing Assessment Model (ALCAM) is an assessment tool used to identify key potential 
risks at level crossings and to assist in the prioritization of railway level crossings according to their comparative 
safety risk. It is used to support a rigorous defensible process for decision making for both road and pedestrian level 
crossings as well as a method to help determine the most cost effective treatments (Nelson-Furnell, 2012). 
In Great Britain the “All Level Crossing Risk Model” (ALCRM) has been used since 2007. Suggestions for its 
upgrading were shown by Barker et al. (2012).  
2. Safety of railway crossings in Hungary 
The length of the railway network in Hungary is about 7700 km, with about 5800 level crossings on it. In the recent 
years a number of safety related measures have been taken: half-barriers were added to automatic open crossings, 
high-intensity LED-traffic signals were mounted, and automated barriers were implemented instead of manual 
operation. Still, about half of the crossings is passive, without any protection. 
Similarly to the general decrease in the number of road accidents, the number of accidents at railway crossings has 
been more than halved since 1990 (Fig. 1). However, the general downward trend seems to break in 2014. Last year 
10 persons died and 21 were seriously injured at level crossings. 
 
Fig. 1. Train – road vehicle crashes at level crossings by crossing types (1990–2014). 
3. Safety ranking of Hungarian railway crossings 
In Hungary a technical guideline defines the safety ranking method of level crossings. A point system was set up 
in 1993 considering the previous accidents, traffic exposure, type of crossing, train and road speed, geometry, traffic 
signs and markings and other risk factors. The share of these components and the calculation of points have been 
changed four times until now. The current split of the weights of the above factors is shown in Fig. 2. The problem of 
this method is that too many data are needed, they are not updated regularly, and therefore the credibility of this 
ranking is low, it is not really used in safety decisions. 
 
Fig. 2. Weights of the safety ranking components from 2008. 
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4. Accident prediction models 
4.1. Data collection and segmentation 
The current approaches used for black spot ranking are conventional ones, there is a need for a more sophisticated 
and statistically justified methodology. To this end a sample of 1771 railway crossings were gathered. The original 
sample was (a sample of all railway crossings in the country) filtered according to a few requirements. Railways with 
public service crossing with paved roads with traffic volume data available were selected for further analysis. 
Five years (2010–2014) of accident data, AADT (Annual Average Daily Traffic) for rail and road, speed limits and 
further data related to the geometry (road pavement width, control devices, crossing angle, alignment, number of 
tracks, sight distances) were gathered. Rail traffic volume were provided by the railway companies, road traffic 
volume data were collected from the National Road Databank. Accident and geometry data were provided by the 
National Transport Authority. These included fatal and injury as well as property damage only accidents. 
Descriptive statistics of the most important data are given in Table 1. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the railway crossing sample used. 
Descriptor  Value Accident numbers 
AADTroad (veh/day) max 21889  
 mean 1242  
 standard deviation 2451  
AADTrail (train/day) max 255  
 mean 26  
 standard deviation 32  
Type of control device passive crossing 310 11 
 flashing lights + half barriers 443 33 
 flashing lights 645 86 
 signalman 195 0 
stop sign 49 3 
full barrier 127 1 
total 1771 134 
4.2. Modeling 
Unlike Poisson models, negative binomial models assume that the conditional means are not equal to the 
conditional variances. Since the accident data were found to be significantly overdispersed relative to its mean, the 
Generalized Linear Modeling approach (GLM) with a negative binomial error structure was used. Modeling was done 
in the R statistical software (R, 2013). The prediction equation estimated is given in Equation (3): 
ܧሺܻሻ ൌ ݁ఈబ ൈ ܣܣܦ ௥ܶ௢௔ௗఈభ ൈ ܣܣܦ ௥ܶ௔௜௟ఈమ ൈ ݁σ ఉೕ௫ೕ
೘ೕసభ
  (3) 
where 
E(Y) = estimated accident count/5 years 
AADTroad = Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT) (vehicles/day) 
AADTrail = Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT) (vehicles/day) 
α0 = constant 
α1 = parameter describing the shape between road traffic volume and number of accidents, 
α2 = parameter describing the shape between rail traffic volume and number of accidents, 
xj = any of m-additional variables and 
βj = coefficients to be estimated. 
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AADT is included with an exponent, as it is known to have a nonlinear relationship with crash incidence. 
Modeling was conducted in the following steps. First, each variable was entered into the model alone to see which 
ones significantly affect accident frequency. As a next step, the sample was split up into subgroups based on the type 
of control devices and with the same approach as before, the predictors were tested one by one. Finally, two-variable 
models were built where expected injury accident frequency is predicted by annual daily road traffic and annual rail 
traffic. 
Several statistical measures can be used to assess the goodness of fit of the models (e.g. Pearson χ2, Scaled 
Deviance, Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), Cumulative residual analysis – CURE plot). These are not detailed 
in this paper, the emphasis is rather put on the modelling results and their interpretation. 
5. Results 
The results give estimation of the impacts of explanatory factors on the safety of railway crossings. As for the 
one-variable models (Table 2) using the full sample significant predictors (based on the p value) are annual daily road 
traffic, annual daily train traffic, rail speed limit, pavement width and obstacle in the crossing sight triangle. A number 
of predictors such as rail speed limit, crossing angle, track alignment, number of tracks and obstacle in the approach 
sight triangle turned out to be not significant. 
The signs of the significant predictors seem to be valid and reasonable. Rail and road traffic both have positive 
signs indicating that with increasing traffic volume crashes tend to rise in a non-linear fashion. Rail speed limit and 
pavement width also have positive signs, however, their magnitude is negligible. Coefficients of obstacles in the 
approach and sight triangles are not consistent, also in terms of the subgroup models, as it can be seen in later tables. 
(With these two variables a reference level is used (no obstacle) and the effect of the presence of obstacles is based 
on the deviation from this reference level.) 
Table 2. Model parameters for the one-variable models (n=1771). 
Variable intercept p value coefficient p value 
AADTroad -3.71335 < 2e-16 *** 0.16816 0.00186 ** 
AADTrail (n=1412) -3.91895 < 2e-16 *** 0.48429 5.47e-07 *** 
road speed limit -2.974205 < 2e-16 *** 0.006487  0.183 
rail speed limit -3.780396 < 2e-16 *** 0.016533 2.42e-09 *** 
crossing angle -2.858882 2.01e-11 *** 0.003671 0.503 
pavement width -2.999575 < 2e-16 *** 0.005206 0.00378 ** 
obstacle in the approach sight triangle 
(reference: no obstacle) -2.8802 <2e-16 *** 0.3304 0.324 
obstacle in the crossing sight triangle 
(reference: no obstacle) -2.3728 <2e-16 *** -0.4353 0.0209 * 
number of tracks -2.49485 <2e-16 *** -0.06956 0.64 
rail in curve (reference level: straight) -2.43279 <2e-16 *** 0.01799 0.939 
The sample was split up into subgroups based on the type of control devices and the same approach as before was 
followed. One-variable models were tested, the coefficients of rail and road traffic volumes and the significant 
predictors are shown in Table 3, 4 and 5, for passive crossings, crossings with flashing lights and crossings with 
flashing lights + half barriers, respectively. 
In two cases traffic volumes seem to be not significant (rail traffic for passive crossings and road traffic for 
crossings with flashing lights + half barriers). The former one might be explained by the fact that passive crossings 
are the ones where rail traffic volume is relatively lower than in other subgroups (average rail traffic volumes: passive 
crossings – 10.19 trains/day, flashing lights – 25.95 trains/day, flashing lights + half barriers – 51.78 trains/day). The 
latter exception with a non-significant road traffic volume might be explained by the nature of the safety device, i.e. 
it is a physical barrier that exerts its effect on irregular crossings irrespective of the traffic volume on the road. In other 
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words, since road users need to get around the barriers in order to cross, crashes result mostly from intentional and 
irregular crossings. 
Interestingly, rail speed limit is a significant predictor in all the three cases, however, again with a marginal negative 
effect on safety. Pavement width is significant in two cases, also with a small value and with a positive coefficient. 
This might be interrelated with road traffic volume, as well, since higher traffic volume would generally imply a wider 
road surface. Again, obstacles in the sight triangles turned out to be significant, but with non-consistent results. 
It is known from the literature that the most important predictor for road crashes is traffic volume. Models using 
the two traffic volume variables were set up (Table 6) and also graphically illustrated in 3D plots (Fig. 3–6) As far as 
the type of control devices are concerned, as expected coefficients are decreasing in the following order: passive 
crossings, flashing lights, flashing lights + barriers. 
Figures 3–6 show the expected number of accidents as a function of road and rail traffic volumes. Figures 3, 5 and 
6 have the same traffic volume scales. However, one has to consider that the “worst” combination (highest road and 
highest rail traffic) does rarely occur as in these cases grade separation is frequently implemented. 
Table 3. Model parameters for passive crossings (n=310). 
Variable intercept p value coefficient p value 
AADTroad -5.5574 5.51e-07 *** 0.4859  0.0223 * 
AADTrail (n=222) -4.8349 0.00145 ** 0.7264 0.16288 
rail speed limit -5.18816 7.53e-08 *** 0.03505 0.0201 * 
pavement width -4.74167 1.38e-07 *** 0.02560 0.066  
Table 4. Model parameters for crossings with flashing lights (n=645). 
Variable intercept p value coefficient p value 
AADTroad -3.21791 2.16e-07 *** 0.17720 0.0444 * 
AADTrail (n=561) -3.5495 6.22e-13 *** 0.5188 0.000214 *** 
rail speed limit -3.010900 < 2e-16 *** 0.013712 0.000326 *** 
obstacle in the approach sight triangle 
(reference: no obstacle) -2.8332 4.79e-08 *** 0.8821 0.0978 
Table 5. Model parameters for crossings with flashing lights + half barriers (n=443). 
Variable intercept p value coefficient p value 
AADTroad -3.22883 0.00348 ** 0.08179 0.55939 
AADTrail (n=432) -5.6295  1.06e-07 *** 0.7815 0.00196 **  
rail speed limit -3.735196 1.2e-08 *** 0.012098 0.0585 
pavement width -3.247430 <2e-16 *** 0.006391 0.01 
obstacle in the approach sight triangle 
(reference: no obstacle) -1.3437 0.000998 *** -1.4007 0.001915 **  
Table 6. Two-variable models with road and rail traffic volume. 
Variable intercept p value AADTroad p value AADTrail p value 
full sample (n=1412) -4.78692 < 2e-16 *** 0.15157 0.00553 ** 0.44019 2.78e-06 *** 
passive crossings (n=222) -8.1244 2.09e-05 ***  0.6715 0.00136 ** 0.8592  0.09541. 
crossings with flashing lights 
(n=432) -5.91932 7.68e-14 ***  0.32990 0.000203 *** 0.56970  3.56e-05 *** 
crossings with flashing lights + 
half barriers (n=561) -6.8852 1.75e-05 *** 0.1479 0.29682 0.8107 0.00127 ** 
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Fig. 3. Expected number of accidents – full sample. 
 
Fig. 4. Expected number of accidents – passive crossings. 
 
Fig. 5. Expected number of accidents – flashing lights. 
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Fig. 6. Expected number of accidents – flashing lights + half barriers. 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
The safety ranking method was subject to several critics in the last few years. The huge amount of data needed led 
to neglect refreshing them. Furthermore, there was no statistical evidence behind the weights. The modelling described 
above gave some statistical base to change the weights of individual factors. As road and rail traffic volumes were 
found to be significant variables, their weight was increased from 25 to 30%. For similar reasons, the weight of the 
crossing type was increased to 20%. Furthermore, the differences between individual crossing types within this 20% 
were adjusted to the results of the above models. As speed showed only marginal effects, its weight was decreased by 
5%. The proposed split of weights is shown in Fig. 7.  
 
 
Fig. 7. Weights of the safety ranking components from 2015. 
Having seen that most of the further variables (such as crossing angle, pavement width, obstacle in the approach 
sight triangle, obstacle in the crossing sight triangle, number of tracks, rail in curve) are not significant predictors of 
accidents, a simplified method was created, considering only the previous accidents, traffic exposure, type of crossing, 
train and road speed with the relative weights as shown in Figure 7. Geometry, traffic signs and markings and other 
risk factors were omitted. As a test, the highest ranking 400 crossings according to the “full” method were evaluated 
by the simplified method (Figure 8).  
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Fig. 8. Ranking of 400 level crossings according to the detailed parameters (horizontal scale) and the reduced parameters (vertical scale). 
It was found that there is a reasonable correlation between the ranks calculated by the detailed and the reduced 
method, especially concerning the top 50 crossings. Therefore this simplified method was included in the new 
technical guidelines. It is hoped that due to the less amount of data, the ranking will be refreshed regularly and it have 
a real impact on safety decisions. 
These findings may represent the state of affairs in railway crossings in Hungary but are not necessarily 
representative of railway crossings in other countries. For example, it is concluded that crossing angle, obstacle in the 
approach sight triangle, and obstacle in the crossing sight triangle are not significant predictors of accidents. While 
that may be true in Hungary, it might not be true in other countries, hence are not necessarily applicable to railway 
crossings at different regions. 
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